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Where is the market going?
Uncertain facts and novel theories
John H. Cochrane
Over the last century, the
stock market in the United
States has yielded impressive
returns to its investors. For
example, in the postwar period,
stock returns have averaged 8 percentage points
above Treasury bills. Will stocks continue to
give such impressive returns in the future? Are
long-term average stock returns a fundamental
feature of advanced industrial economies? Or are
they the opposite of the old joke on Soviet agri-
culture—100 years of good luck? If not pure
good luck, perhaps they result from features of
the economy that will disappear as financial
markets evolve.
How does the recent rise in the stock mar-
ket affect our view of future returns? Do high
prices now mean lower returns in the future?
Or have stocks finally achieved Irving Fisher’s
brilliantly mistimed 1929 prediction of a “per-
manently high plateau?” If stocks have reached
a plateau, is it a rising plateau, or is the market
likely to bounce around its current level for many
years, not crashing but not yielding returns much
greater than those of bonds?
These questions are on all of our minds as
we allocate our pension plan monies. They are
also important to many public policy questions.
For example, many proposals to reform social
security emphasize the benefits of moving to
a funded system based on stock market invest-
ments. But this is a good idea only if the stock
market continues to provide the kind of returns
in the future that it has in the past.
In this article, I summarize the academic,
and if I dare say so, scientific, evidence on
these issues. I start with the statistical analysis
of past stock returns. The long-term average
return is in fact rather poorly measured. The
standard statistical confidence interval extends
from 3 percent to 13 percent. Furthermore,
average returns have been low following times
of high stock prices, such as the present. There-
fore, the statistical evidence suggests a period
of quite low average returns, followed by slow
reversion to a poorly measured long-term average,
and it cautions us that statistical analysis alone
leaves lots of uncertainty.
Then, I survey economic theory to see if
standard models that summarize a vast amount
of other information shed light on stock returns.
Standard models do not predict anything like
the historical equity premium. After a decade
of effort, a range of drastic modifications to the
standard models can account for the historical
equity premium. But it remains to be seen
whether the drastic modifications and a high
equity premium, or the standard models and a
low equity premium will triumph in the end. In
sum, economic theory gives one further reason
to fear that long-term average excess returns
will not return to 8 percent, and it details the kind
of beliefs one must have about the economy to
reverse that pessimistic view.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4
However, I conclude with a warning that
low average returns do not imply one should
change one’s portfolio. Someone has to hold
every stock on the market. An investor should
only hold less stocks than average if that investor
is different from the average investor in some
identifiable way, such as risk exposure, attitude,
or information.
Average returns and risk
The most obvious place to start thinking
about future stock returns is a statistical analysis
of past stock returns.
Average real returns
Table 1 presents several measures of average
real returns on stocks and bonds in the postwar
period. The value weighted NYSE portfolio
shows an impressive annual return of 9 percent
after inflation. The S&P 500 is similar. The
equally weighted NYSE portfolio weights
small stocks more than the value weighted
portfolio. Small stock returns have been even
better than the market on average, so the equally
weighted portfolio has earned more than 11
percent. Bonds by contrast seem a disaster.
Long-term government bonds earned only 1.8
percent after inflation, despite a standard devi-
ation (11 percent) more than half that of stocks
(about 17 percent). Corporate bonds earned a
slight premium over government bonds, but at
2.1 percent are still unappealing compared to
stocks. Treasury bills earned only 0.8 percent
on average after inflation.
A reward for risk
Table 1 highlights a crucially important
fact. High average returns are only earned as a
compensation for risk. High stock returns can-
not be understood merely as high “productivity
of the American economy” (or high marginal
productivity of capital) or impatience by con-
sumers. Such high productivity or impatience
would lead to high returns on bonds as well.
To understand average stock returns, and to
assess whether they will continue at these levels,
it is not necessary to understand why the econ-
omy gives such high returns to saving—it
doesn’t—but why it gives such high compensa-
tion for bearing risk. The risk is substantial.
A 17 percent standard deviation means the
market is quite likely to decline 9 – 17 = 8%
or rise 9 + 17 = 26% in a year. (More precisely,
there is about a 30 percent probability of a
decline bigger than –8 percent or a rise bigger
than 26 percent.)
Risk at short and long horizons
It is a common fallacy to dismiss this risk
as “short-run price fluctuation” and to argue that
stock market risk declines in the long run.
The most common way to fall into this trap
is to confuse the annualized or average return
with the actual return. For example, the two-year
log or continuously compounded return is the
sum of the one-year returns, r0®2 = r0®1+ r1®2 .
Then, if returns were independent over time, like
coin flips, the mean and variance would scale the
same way with horizon: E(r0®2 ) = 2E(r0®1 )
and s2(r 0®2) = 2 s2(r0®1 ). Investors who cared
about mean and variance would invest the same
fraction of their wealth in stocks for any return
horizon. The variance of annualized returns
does stabilize; s(1/2 r0®2) = 1/2 s2(r0®1). But
the investor cares about the total, not annual-
ized return. An example may clarify the dis-
tinction. Suppose you are betting $1 on a coin
flip. This is a risky bet, you will either gain or
lose $1. If you flip the coin 1,000 times, the aver-
age number of heads (annualized returns) will
almost certainly come out quite near 50 percent.
Annual real returns 1947–96
TABLE 1
VW  S&P500  EW GB CB TB
  (- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -)
Average return E(R) 9.1 9.5 11.0 1.8 2.1 0.8
Standard deviation   s( ) R 16.7 16.8 22.2 11.1 10.7 2.6
Standard error s( ) / R T 2.4 2.4 3.0 1.6 1.5 0.4
Notes: VW = value weighted NYSE, EW = equally weighted NYSE, GB = ten-year government bond,
CB = corporate bond, TB = three-month Treasury bills. All less CPI inflation.
Source: All data for this and subsequent figures and tables in this article are from the Center for Research
on Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 5
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However, the risk of the bet (total return) is
much larger: It only takes an average number
of heads equal to 0.499 (that is, 499/1,000) to
lose a dollar; if the average number of heads is
0.490, still very close to 0.5, you lose $10. Just
as we care about dollars, not the fraction of
heads, we care about total returns, not annual-
ized rates.
To address the short-run price fluctuation
fallacy directly, table 2 shows that mean returns
and standard deviations scale with horizon just
about as this independence argument suggests,
out to five years.
(In fact, returns are not exactly indepen-
dent over time. Estimates in Fama and French
[1988a] and Poterba and Summers [1988]
suggest that the variance grows a bit less slowly
than the horizon for the first five to ten years,
and then grows with horizon as before, so
stocks are in fact a bit safer for long horizons
than the independence assumption suggests.
However, this qualification does not rescue the
annualized return fallacy. Also bear in mind
that long-horizon statistics are measured even
less well than annual statistics; there are only
five nonoverlapping ten-year samples in the
postwar period.)
The stock market is like a coin flip, but it
is a biased coin flip. Thus, even though mean
and variance may grow at the same rate with
horizon, the probability that one
loses money in the stock market
does decline over time. (For exam-
ple, for the normal distribution, tail
probabilities are governed by E(r)/
s(r), which grows at the square
root of horizon.) However, portfolio
advice is not based on pure proba-
bilities of making or losing money;
but on measures such as the mean
and variance of return. Based on
such measures, there is not much
presumption that stocks are dramati-
cally safer for long-run investments.
I cannot stress enough that the
high average returns come only as
compensation for risk. Our task
below is to understand this risk and
people’s aversion to it. Many dis-
cussions, including those surrounding
the move to a funded social security
system, implicitly assume that one
gets the high returns without taking
on substantial risk. What happens to a funded
social security system if the market goes down?
Means versus standard
deviations—Sharpe ratio
Figure 1 presents mean returns versus their
standard deviations. In addition to the portfoli-
os listed in table 1, I include ten portfolios of
NYSE stocks sorted by size. This picture
shows that average returns alone are not a
particularly useful measure. By taking on more
risk, one can achieve very high average re-
turns. In the picture, the small stock portfolio
How risk and return vary with
investment horizon
TABLE 2
1 8.6 17.1 0.50
2 9.1 17.9 0.51
3 9.2 16.8 0.55
5 10.5 21.9 0.48
Notes: Re = value weighted return less T-bill rate.
Column one shows average excess return divided
by horizon. Column two shows standard deviation
of excess return divided by square root of horizon.
Column three shows Sharpe ratio divided by square
root of horizon. All statistics in percent.
Horizon h
   (years)
FIGURE 1
Mean vs. standard deviation of real returns, 1947–96
Notes: Triangles are equally weighted and value weighted NYSE; S&P 500;
three-month Treasury bill; ten-year government bond; and corporate bond
returns. Unmarked squares are NYSE size portfolios.
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earns over 15 percent per year average real
return, though at the cost of a huge standard
deviation. Furthermore, one can form portfolios
with even higher average returns by leveraging—
borrowing money to buy stocks—or investing
in securities such as options that are very sensi-
tive to stock returns. Since standard deviation
(and beta or other risk measures) grow exactly
as fast as mean return, the extra mean return
gained in this way exactly corresponds to the
extra risk of such portfolios. When considering
economic models, it is easy to get them to
produce higher mean returns (along with higher
standard deviations) by considering claims to
leveraged capital.
In sum, excess returns of stocks over Trea-
sury bills are more interesting than the level of
returns. This is the part of return that is a com-
pensation for risk, and it accounts for nearly all
of the amazingly high average stock returns.
Furthermore, the Sharpe ratio of mean excess
return to standard deviation, or the slope of a
line connecting stock returns to a risk-free
interest rate in figure 1, is a better measure of
the fundamental characteristic of stocks than
the mean excess return itself, since it is invari-
ant to leveraging. The stock portfolios listed in
table 1 all have Sharpe ratios near 0.5.
Standard errors
The average returns and Sharpe ratios look
impressive. But are these true or just chance?
One meaning of chance is this: Suppose that the
average excess return really is low, say 3 percent.
How likely is it that a 50-year sample has an
average excess return of 8 percent? Similarly, if
the next 50 years are “just like” the last 50, in the
sense that the structure of the economy is the same
but the random shocks may be different, what is
the chance that the average return in the next 50
years will be as good as it was in the last 50?
Since we only see one sample, these ques-
tions are really unanswerable at a deep level.
Statistics provides an educated guess in the
standard error. Assuming that each year’s
return is statistically independent, our best
guess of the standard deviation of the average
return is s / T , where s is the standard devia-
tion of annual returns and T is the data size.
This formula tells us something important:
Stock returns are so volatile that it is very hard
to statistically measure average returns. Table 1
includes standard errors of stock returns mea-
sured in the last 50 years, and table 3 shows
standard errors for a variety of horizons.
The confidence interval, mean +/–2 standard
deviations, represents the 95 percent probability
range. As the table shows, even very long-term
averages leave a lot of uncertainty about mean
returns. For example, with 50 years of data, an
8 percent average excess return is measured
with a 2.4 percentage point standard error. Thus,
the confidence interval says that the true aver-
age excess return is between 8 – 2 ´ 2.4 = 3%
and 8 + 2 ´ 2.4 = 13% with 95 percent proba-
bility.1 This is a wide band of uncertainty about
the true market return, given 50 years of data.
One can also see that five- or ten-year averages
are nearly useless; it takes a long time to sta-
tistically discern that the average return has
increased or decreased. As a cold winter need
not presage an ice age, so even a decade of bad
returns need not change one’s view of the true
underlying average return.
The standard errors are also the standard
deviations of average returns over the next T
years, and table 3 shows that there is quite a lot
of uncertainty about those returns. For example,
if the true mean excess return is and will con-
tinue to be 8 percent, the five-year standard error
of 7.6 percent is almost as large as the mean. This
means that there is still a good chance that the
next five-year return will average less than the
Treasury bill rate.
On the other hand, though the average
return on stocks is not precisely known, the 2.4
percent standard error means that we can confi-
dently reject the view that the true mean excess
return was zero or even 2–3 percent. The argu-
ment that all the past equity premium was luck
doesn’t hold up well against this simple statis-
tical argument.
Standard error of average return
at various horizons
TABLE 3






Note: Returns assumed to be statistically
independent with standard deviation
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Selection and crashes
Two important assumptions behind the
standard error calculation, however, suggest ways
in which the postwar average stock return might
still have been largely due to luck. Argentina
and the U.S. looked very similar at the middle
of the last century. Both economies were un-
derdeveloped relative to Britain and Germany
and had about the same per capita income. If
Argentina had experienced the U.S.’s growth
and stock returns, and vice versa, this article
would be written in Spanish from the Buenos
Aires Federal Reserve Bank, with high Argentine
stock returns as the subject.
The statistical danger this story points to is
selection or survival bias. If you flip one coin
ten times, the chance of seeing eight heads is
low. But if you flip ten coins ten times, the
chance that the coin with the greatest number
of heads exceeds eight heads is much larger.
Does this story more closely capture the 50-year
return on U.S. stocks? Brown, Goetzmann, and
Ross (1995) present a strong case that the uncer-
tainty about true average stock returns is much
larger than s / T  suggests. As they put it,
“Looking back over the history of the London
or the New York stock markets can be extraor-
dinarily comforting to an investor—equities
appear to have provided a substantial premium
over bonds, and markets appear to have recov-
ered nicely after huge crashes. . . . Less com-
forting is the past history of other major mar-
kets: Russia, China, Germany, and Japan. Each
of these markets has had one or more major
interruptions that prevent their inclusion in
long term studies” [my emphasis].
In addition, think of the things that didn’t
happen in the last 50 years. There were no
banking panics, no depressions, no civil wars,
no constitutional crises, the cold war was not
lost, and no missiles were fired over Berlin,
Cuba, Korea, or Vietnam. If any of these things
had happened, there undoubtedly would have
been a calamitous decline in stock values. The
statistical problem is nonnormality. Taking the
standard deviation from a sample that did not
include rare calamities, and calculating average
return probabilities from a normal distribution
may understate the true uncertainty. But inves-
tors, aware of that uncertainty, discount prices
and hence leave high returns on the table.
We can cast the issue in terms of funda-
mental beliefs about the economy. Was it clear
to people in 1945 (or 1871, or whenever the
sample starts) and throughout the period that
the average return on stocks would be 8 percent
greater than that of bonds? If so, one would
expect them to have bought more stocks, even
considering the risk described by the 17 per-
cent year-to-year variation. But perhaps it was
not in fact obvious in 1945, that rather than
slipping back into depression, the U.S. would
experience a half century of growth never be-
fore seen in human history. If so, much of the
equity premium was unexpected; good luck.
Time varying expected returns
Regressions of returns on price/dividend ratios
We are not only concerned with the aver-
age return on stocks but whether returns are
expected to be unusually low at a time of high
prices, such as the present. The first and most
natural thing one might do to answer this ques-
tion is to look at a regression forecast. To this
end, table 4 presents regressions of returns on
the price/dividend (P/D) ratio.
OLS  regressions of excess returns and dividend growth on VW P/D ratio
TABLE 4
Horizon k
(years) b s s s s s(b) R 2 b s s s s s(b) R 2
1 –1.04 (0.33) 0.17 –0.39 (0.18) 0.07
2 –2.04 (0.66) 0.26 –0.52 (0.40) 0.07
3 –2.84 (0.88) 0.38 –0.53 (0.43) 0.07
5 –6.22 (1.24) 0.59 –0.99 (0.47) 0.15
Notes: Rt®t+k indicates the k year return on the value weighted NYSE portfolio less the k year
return from continuously reinvesting in Treasury bills; b = regression slope coefficient
(defined by the regression equation above); s(b) = standard error of regression coefficient.
Standard errors in parentheses use GMM to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Rt® ® ® ® ®t+k = a + b(Pt/Dt) Dt+k/Dt = a + b(Pt/Dt)ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 8
The regression at a one-year horizon
shows that excess returns are in fact predictable
from P/D ratios, though the 0.17 R2 is not par-
ticularly remarkable. However, at longer and
longer horizons, the slope coefficients increase
and larger and larger fractions of return varia-
tion can be forecasted. At a five-year horizon,
60 percent of the variation in stock returns can
be forecasted ahead of time from the P/D ratio.
(Fama and French, 1988b, is a famous early
source for this kind of regression.)
One can object to dividends as the divisor
for prices. However, price divided by just
about anything sensible works about as well,
including earnings, book value, and moving
averages of past prices. There seems to be an
additional business-cycle component of expected
return variation that is tracked by the term spread
or other business cycle forecasting variables,
including the default spread and investment–
capital ratio, the T-bill rate, the ratio of the T-
bill rate to its moving average, and the dividend/
earnings ratio. (See Fama and French, 1989,
for term and default spreads, Campbell, 1987,
for term spread, Cochrane, 1991c, for investment–
capital ratios, Lamont, 1997, for dividend/earn-
ings, and Ferson and Constantinides, 1991, for
an even more exhaustive list with references).
However, price ratios such as P/D are the most
important forecasting variables, especially at long
horizons, so I focus on the P/D ratio to keep the
analysis simple. In a similar fashion, cross-
sectional variation in expected returns can be
very well described by the P/D ratio or (better)
the ratio of market value to book value, which
contains the price in its numerator. Portfolios
of “undervalued” or “value” stocks with low
price ratios outperform portfolios of “overvalued”
or “growth” stocks with high price ratios. (See
Fama and French, 1993).
 Slow moving P/D and P/E
Figure 2 presents P/D and price/earnings
(P/E) ratios over time. This graph emphasizes
that price ratios are very slow moving variables.
This is why they forecast long-horizon move-
ments in stock returns.
The rise in forecast power with horizon is
not a separate phenomenon. It results from the
ability to forecast one period returns and the
slow movement in the P/D ratio.2 As an analogy,
if it is ten degrees below zero in Chicago (low
P/D ratio), one’s best guess is that it will warm
up a degree or so per day. Spring does come,
albeit slowly. However, the weather varies a lot;
it can easily go up or down 20 degrees in a day,
so this forecast is not very accurate (low R2).
But the fact that it is ten degrees below zero
signals that the temperature will rise a bit on
average per day for many days. By the time we
look at a six-month horizon, we forecast a 90
degree rise in temperature. The daily variation
of 20 degrees is still there, but the change in
temperature (90 degrees) that can
be forecasted is much larger
relative to the daily variation,
implying a high R2.
The slow movement in the
P/D ratio also means that the
ability to forecast returns is not
the fabled alchemists’ stone that
turns lead into gold. A high P/D
ratio means that prices will
grow more slowly than divi-
dends for a long time until the
P/D ratio is reestablished, and
vice versa. Trading on these
signals—buying more stocks in
times of low prices, and less in
times of high prices—can raise
(unconditional) average returns
a bit, but not much more than











P/D and P/E ratios
Notes: VW is value weighted NYSE portfolio. Two times the S&P 500 P/E
ratio is plotted so that the lines can be more easily compared.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 9
deviation. If there were a 50 percent R2 at a
daily horizon, one could make a lot of money;
but not so at a five-year horizon.
The slow movement of the P/D ratio also
means that on a purely statistical basis, one can
cast doubt on whether the P/D ratio really
forecasts returns. What we really know, look-
ing at figure 2 (figure 4 also makes this point),
is that low prices relative to dividends and
earnings in the 1950s preceded the boom mar-
ket of the early 1960s; that the high P/D ratios
of the mid-1960s preceded the poor returns of
the 1970s; and that the low price ratios of the
mid-1970s preceded the current boom. We also
know that price ratios are very high now. In any
real sense, there really are three data points. I
do not want to survey the extensive statistical
literature that formalizes this point, but it is
there. Most importantly, it shows that the t-statis-
tics one might infer from regressions such as
table 4 are inflated; with more sophisticated
tests, return predictability actually has about a
10 percent probability value before one starts
to worry about fishing and selection biases.
What about repurchases? P/E
and other forecasts
Is the P/D ratio still a valid signal? Per-
haps increasing dividend repurchases mean
that the P/D ratio will not return to its histori-
cal low values; perhaps it has shifted to a new
mean so today’s high ratio is not
bad for returns. To address this
issue, figure 2 plots the S&P 500 P/E
ratio along with the P/D ratio. The
two measures line up well. The P/E
ratio forecasts returns almost as
well as the P/D ratio. The P/E ratio,
price/book value, and other ratios
are also at historic highs, forecasting
low returns for years to come. Yet
they are of course immune to the
criticism that the dividend–earnings
relationship might be fundamentally
different from the past.
Return forecasts
What do the regressions of table
4 say, quantitatively, about future
returns? Figure 3 presents one-year
returns and the P/D ratio forecast.
Figure 4 presents five-year returns
and the P/D ratio forecast. I include
in-sample and out-of-sample fore-
casts in figures 3 and 4. To form
the out-of-sample forecasts, I paired the regres-
sions from table 4 with an autoregression of P/Dt,
PD PD tt t + + =+ + 1 1 mr d .
Then, for example, since my data run
through the end of 1996, the forecast returns












The one-year return forecast is extraordi-
narily pessimistic. It starts at a –8 percent excess
return for 1997, and only very slowly returns to
the estimated unconditional mean excess return
of 8 percent. In ten years, the forecast is still –5
percent, in 25 years it is –1.75 percent, and it is
still only 2.35 percent in 50 years. The five-year
return forecasts are similarly pessimistic.
Of course, this forecast is subject to lots
of uncertainty. There is uncertainty about what
actual returns will be, given the forecasts. This
will always be true: If one could precisely
forecast the direction of stock prices, stocks
would cease to be risky and would cease to
pay a risk premium. There is also a great deal
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Actual and forecast one-year excess returns
Notes: One-year excess returns on the value weighted NYSE and
forecast from a regression on the P/D ratio. Returns are plotted on the
day of the forecast. For example, 1995 plots a + b  ×  P/D1995 and the
1996 return. The out-of-sample forecast is made by joining Rt+1 = a + bP/Dt
with P/Dt+1 = m  +  rP/Dt.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 10
The forecasts attempt to measure expected
returns, the quantity that investors must trade
off against unavoidable risk in deciding how
attractive an investment is, and they undoubt-
edly measure expected returns with error.
The plots of actual returns on top of the
in-sample, one-year-ahead forecasts in figures 3
and 4 give one measure of the forecast uncertainty.
One can see that year-to-year returns are quite
likely to vary a lot given the
forecast. Five-year returns track
the forecast more closely, but
here the chance of over-fitting
is greater.
To get a handle on how
reliable or robust the pessimistic
forecast is, figure 5 gives a
scatter plot of one-year returns
and their forecasts based on
P/D, together with the fitted
regression line. The scatterplot
indicates that the regression
results are not spurious, or the
result of a few outlying years.
The point marked “97?” is
the P/D ratio at the end of 1996
together with the forecast return
for 1997. We see immediately
one source of trouble with the
point forecast: the P/D ratio has
never in the postwar period been
as high as it is now. Extending
historical experience to never-
before seen values is always dangerous. One is
particularly uncomfortable with a prediction
that the market should earn less than the T-bill
rate, given the strong theoretical presumption
for a positive expected excess return.4 One
could easily draw a downward sloping line
through the points, flattening out on the right,
predicting a zero excess return for P/D ratios
above 30 to 35, and never predicting a negative
excess return. A nonlinear re-
gression that incorporates this
idea will fit about as well as the
linear regression I have run.
However, the scatterplot does
not demand such a nonlinear
relation either, so this is largely
a matter of choice. In sum,
while the scatterplot does sug-
gest that the current forecast
should be low, it does not give
robust evidence that the forecast
excess return should be negative.
What about the last few years of
high returns?
The P/D ratios also pointed
to low returns in 1995 and
1996. Anyone who took that
advice missed out on a dramatic
surge in the market, and some
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Actual and forecast five-year excess returns
Notes: Five-year excess returns on value weighted NYSE (five-year returns
minus five-year T-bill returns) and forecast from a regression of five-year
returns on the P/D ratio. Returns are plotted on the last day; for example,
1996 plots the forecast a + b  ×  P/D1991 and the return from 1991 to 1996.
The out-of-sample forecast is formed for 1997–2001 from the observed
P/D ratios, 1992–96, and for 2002 onward from P/D
t = m + 0.98P/D
t–1.













One-year excess returns vs. one-year ahead
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advice are now unemployed. Doesn’t this
mean that the P/D signal should no longer
be trusted?
To answer this criticism, look at the figures
again. They make clear that the returns for 1995
and 1996 and even another 20 percent or so
return for 1997 are not so far out of line, despite
a pessimistic P/D forecast, that we should throw
away the regression based on the previous 47
years of experience. To return to the analogy,
if it is ten degrees below zero in Chicago, that
means spring is coming. But we can easily have
a few weeks of 20 degree below weather before
spring finally arrives. The graphs make vivid
how large a 17 percent standard deviation
really is, and to what extent the forecasts based
on the P/D ratio mark long-term tendencies
that are still subject to lots of short-term swings
rather than accurate forecasts of year-to-year
booms or crashes.
Another source of uncertainty about the
forecast is how persistent the P/D ratio really
is. If, for example, the P/D ratio had no persis-
tence, then the low return forecast would only
last a year. After that, it would return to the
unconditional mean of 9 percent (8 percent
over Treasury bills). Now, given a true value
r = 0.98 in P/Dt = m + rP/D t-1 + dt, the median
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate is 0.90,
as I found in sample. That is why figure 3 uses
the value r = 0.98. However, given this true
value, the OLS estimate lies between 0.83 and
0.94 only 50 percent of the time and between
0.66 and 1.00 for 95 percent of the time. Thus,
there is a huge range of uncertainty over the true
value of r. The best thing that could happen to
the forecast is if the P/D ratio were really less
persistent than it seems. In this case, the near-
term return forecast would be unchanged, but
the long-term return forecast would return to 9
percent much more quickly.
Variance decomposition
When prices are high relative to dividends
(or earnings, cash flow, book value, or some
other divisor), one of three things must be
true: 1) Investors expect dividends to rise in the
future. 2) Investors expect returns to be low in the
future. Future cash flows are discounted at a
lower than usual rate, leading to higher prices.
3) Investors expect prices to keep rising forever,
in a “bubble.” This is not a theory, it is an
accounting identity like 1=1: If the P/D ratio is
high, either dividends must rise, prices must
decline, or the P/D ratio must never return to its
historical average. Which of the three options
holds for our stock market?
Historically, virtually all variation in P/D
ratios has reflected varying expected returns.
At a simple level, table 4 makes this point with
regressions of long-horizon dividend growth
on P/D ratios to match the regressions of returns
on P/D ratios. The dividend-growth coefficients
are much smaller, typically one standard error
from zero, and the R2 values are tiny. Worse,
the signs are wrong. To the extent that a high
P/D ratio forecasts any change in dividends, it
seems to forecast a small decline in dividends.
To be a little more precise, the identity
1 =   +1
–1
+1 +1
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where r = P/D/(1 + P/D) is a constant of approxi-
mation, slightly less than one and lowercase
letters denote logarithms (Campbell and Shiller,
1988). Equation 1 gives a precise meaning to
my earlier statement that a high P/D ratio must
be followed by high dividend growth Dd, low
returns r, or a bubble.
Bubbles do not appear to be the reason for
historical P/D ratio variation. Unless the P/D
ratio grows faster than 1/r j, there is no bubble.
It is hard to believe that P/D ratios can grow
forever. Empirically, P/D ratios do not seem
to have a trend or unit root over time.5
This still leaves two possibilities: are high
prices signals of high dividend growth or low
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P/D ratios can only vary if they forecast
changing dividend growth or if they forecastECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 12
changing returns. Equation 2 has powerful
implications. At first glance, it would seem a
reasonable approximation that returns cannot be
forecasted (the “random walk” hypothesis) and
neither can dividend growth. But if this were
the case, the P/D ratio would have to be a con-
stant. Thus, the fact that the P/D ratio varies at
all means that either dividend growth or returns
can be forecasted.
This observation solidifies one’s belief in
P/D ratio forecasts of returns. Yes, the statistical
evidence that P/D ratios forecast returns is weak.
But P/D ratios have varied. The choice is, P/D
ratios forecast returns or they forecast dividend
growth. They have to forecast something. Given
this choice and table 3, it seems a much firmer
conclusion that they forecast returns.
Table 5 presents some estimates of the
price-dividend variance decomposition (equa-
tion 2), taken from Cochrane (1991b). As one
might suspect from table 4, table 5 shows that
in the past almost all variation in P/D ratios
has been due to changing return forecasts.
(The rows of table 5 do not add up to exactly
100 percent because equation 2 is an approxi-
mation. The elements do not have to be be-
tween 0 and 100 percent. For example, –34,
138 occurs because high prices seem to fore-
cast lower dividend growth. Therefore they
must and do forecast really low returns. The
real and nominal rows differ because P/D fore-
casts inflation in the sample.)
So much for history. What does it mean?
Again, we live at a moment of historically
unprecedented P/D, P/E, and other multiples.
Perhaps this time high prices reflect high long-run
dividend growth. If so, the prices have to reflect
an unprecedented expectation of future dividend
growth: the P/D ratio is about double its long-
term average, so the level of dividends has to
double, above and beyond its usual growth.
However, if this time is at all like the past, high
prices reflect low future returns.
The bottom line
Statistical analysis suggests that the long-
term average return on broad stock market
indexes is 8 percent greater than the T-bill rate,
with a standard error of about 3 percent. High
prices are related to low subsequent excess
returns. Based on these patterns, the expected
excess return (stock return less T-bill rate) is
near zero for the next five years or so, and then
slowly rising to the historical average. The large
standard deviation of excess returns, about 17
percent, means that actual returns will certainly
deviate substantially from the expected return.
Finally, one always gets more expected return
by taking on more risk.
Economics: Understanding the
equity premium
Statistical analysis of past returns leaves
a lot of uncertainty about future returns. Further-
more, it is hard to believe that average excess
returns are 8 percent without knowing why
this is so. Perhaps most important, no statistical
analysis can predict if the future will be like
the past. Even if the true expected excess return
was 8 percent, did that result from fundamen-
tal or temporary features of the economy?
Thus, we need an economic understanding
of stock returns.
Economic theory and modeling is often
portrayed as an ivory tower exercise, out of
touch with the real world. Nothing could be
further from the truth, especially in this case.
Many superficially plausible stories have been
put forth to explain the historically high return
on stocks and the time-variation of returns.
Economic models or theories make these stories
explicit, check whether they are internally
consistent, see if they can quantitatively explain
stock returns, and check that they do not make
wildly counterfactual predictions in other dimen-
sions, for example, requiring wild variation in
risk-free rates or strong persistent movements
in consumption growth. Few stories survive
this scrutiny.
We have a vast experience with economic
theory; a range of model economies have
formed the backbone of our understanding of
Variance decomposition




Standard error (10) (32)
Nominal 30 85
Standard error (41) (19)
Notes: VW = value weighted NYSE. Table entries
are the percent of the variance of the price/dividend
ratio attributable to dividend and return forecasts,
100 × cov(pt–dt, S15
j=1 rj Ddt+j)/var(pt–dt) and similarly
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economic growth and dynamic micro, macro,
and international economics for close to 25
years. Does a large equity premium make sense
in terms of such standard economics? Did people
in 1947, and throughout the period, know that
stocks were going to yield 8 percent over bonds
on average, yet were rationally unwilling to
hold more stocks because they were afraid
of the 17 percent standard deviation or some
other measure of stocks’ risk? If so, we have
“explained” the equity premium. If so, statis-
tics from the past may well describe the future,
since neither people’s preferences nor the riski-
ness of technological opportunities seems to
have changed dramatically. But what if it makes
no sense that people should be so scared of
stocks? In this case, it is much more likely that
the true premium is small, and the historical
returns were in fact just good luck.
The answer is simple: Standard economic
models utterly fail to produce anything like the
historical average stock return or the variation
in expected returns over time. After ten years
of intense effort, there is a range of drastic
modifications to standard models that can
explain the equity premium and return predict-
ability and (harder still) are not inconsistent
with a few obvious related facts about con-
sumption and interest rates. However, these
models are truly drastic modifications; they
fundamentally change the description of the
source of risk that commands a premium in
asset markets. Furthermore, they have not yet
been tested against the broad range of experi-
ence of the standard models. These facts must
mean one of two things. Either the standard
models are wrong and will change drastically,
or the phenomenon is wrong and will disappear.
I first show how the standard model utterly
fails to account for the historical equity premium
(Sharpe ratio). The natural response is to see
if perhaps we can modify the standard model.
I consider what happens if we simply allow a
very high level of risk aversion. The answer
here, as in many early attempts to modify the
standard model, is unsatisfactory. While one
can explain the equity premium, easy explana-
tions make strongly counterfactual predictions
regarding other facts. The goal is to explain the
equity premium in a manner consistent with the
level and volatility of consumption growth (both
about 1 percent per year), the predictability of
stock returns described above, the relative lack
of predictability in consumption growth, the
relative constancy of real risk-free rates over
time and across countries, and the relatively
low correlation of stock returns with consump-
tion growth. This is a tough assignment, which
is only now starting to be accomplished.
Then I survey alternative views that do
promise to account for the equity premium,
without (so far) wildly counterfactual predic-
tions on other dimensions. Each modification
is the culmination of a decade-long effort by a
large number of researchers. (For literature
reviews, see Kocherlakota, 1996, and Cochrane
and Hansen, 1992). The first model maintains
the complete and frictionless market simplifi-
cation, but changes the specification of how
people feel about consumption over time, by
adding habit persistence in a very special way
that produces a strong precautionary saving
motive. The second model abandons the perfect
markets simplification. Here, uninsurable indi-
vidual-level risks are the key to the equity pre-
mium. I will also discuss a part of an emerging
view that the equity premium and time-variation
of expected returns result from the fact that few
people hold stocks. This view is not flushed
out yet to a satisfactory model, but does give
some insight.
Both modifications answer the basic ques-
tion, “why are consumers so afraid of stocks?”
in a similar way, and give a fundamentally
different answer from the standard model’s
view that expected returns are driven by risks
to wealth or consumption. The modifications
both say that consumers are really afraid of
stocks because stocks pay off poorly in reces-
sions. In one case a recession means a time
when consumption has recently fallen, no matter
what its level. In the second case a recession is
a time of unusually high cross-sectional (though
not aggregate) uncertainty. In both cases the
raw risk to wealth is not a particularly impor-
tant part of the story.
The standard model
To say anything about dynamic economics,
we have to say something about how people
are willing to trade consumption in one moment
and set of circumstances (state of nature) for
consumption in another moment and set of
circumstances. For example, if people were
always willing to give up a dollar of consump-
tion today for $1.10 in a year, then the economy
would feature a steady 10 percent interest rate.
It also might have quite volatile consumption,ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14
as people accept many such opportunities. If
people did not care what the circumstances
were in which they would get $1.10, then all
expected returns would be equal to the interest
rate (risk neutrality). Of course, this is an ex-
treme example. There certainly comes a point
at which such willingness to substitute con-
sumption becomes strained. If someone were
going to consume $1,000 this year but $10,000
next year, it might take a bit more than a 10
percent interest rate to get him or her to con-
sume even less this year.
To capture these ideas about people’s
willingness to substitute consumption, we use
a utility function that gives a numerical “happi-
ness” value for every possible stream of future
consumption,
3







E  denotes expectation; Ct denotes consumption
at date t; r is the subjective discount factor;
and e–rt captures the fact that consumers prefer
earlier consumption to later. The function u(×)
is increasing and concave, to reflect the idea
that people always like more consumption, but
at a diminishing rate. The function u(C) = C1–g
is a common specification, with g between 0
and 5. g = 0 or u(C) = C corresponds to risk
neutrality, a constant interest rate r, and a
perfect willingness to substitute across time.
g = 1 corresponds to u(C) = ln(C), which is a
very attractive choice since it implies that each
doubling of consumption adds the same amount
of happiness. For most asset pricing problems,
writing the utility function over an infinite
lifespan is a convenient simplification that
makes little difference to the results. Economic
models are often written in discrete time, in












Dynamic economics takes this representa-
tion of people’s preferences and mixes it with
a representation of technological opportunities
for production and investment. For example,
the simplest model might specify that output is
made from capital, Y = f(K), output is invested
or consumed, Y = C+I, and capital depreciates
but is increased by investment, Kt+1 = (1-d)Kt + It
in discrete time. To study business cycles, one
adds detail, including at least labor, leisure,
and shocks. To study monetary issues, one
adds some friction that induces people to use
money, and so on.
Despite the outward appearance of tension,
this is a great unifying moment for macroeco-
nomics. Practically all issues relating to busi-
ness cycles, growth, aggregate policy analysis,
monetary economics, and international economics
are studied in the context of variants of this
simple model. The remaining differences con-
cern details of implementation.
Since this basic economic framework
explains such a wide range of phenomena, what
does it predict for the equity risk premium? Give
the opportunity to buy assets such as stocks
and bonds to a consumer whose preferences
are described by equation 3, and figure out
what the optimal consumption and portfolio
decision is. (The appendix includes derivations
of all equations.) The following conditions
describe the optimal choice:
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where Dc denotes the proportional change in
consumption, r denotes a risky asset return, r f
denotes the risk-free rate, cov denotes covari-








is a measure of curvature or risk aversion.
Higher g means that more consumption gives
less pleasure very quickly; it implies that people
are less willing to substitute less consumption
now for more consumption later and to take risks.
Equation 5 expresses the most fundamental
idea in finance. It says that the average excess
return on any security must be proportional to
the covariance of that return with marginal
utility and, hence, consumption growth. This
is because people value financial assets that
can be used to smooth consumption over time
and in response to risks. For example, a “risky”
stock, one that has a high standard deviation
s(r), may nonetheless command no greater
average return E(r) than the risk-free rate if itsFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 15
return is uncorrelated with consumption growth
corr(Dc,r) = 0. If it yields any more, the consumer
can buy just a little bit of the security, and come
out ahead because the risk is perfectly diversifi-
able. Readers familiar with the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) will recognize the intu-
ition; replacing wealth or the market portfolio
with consumption gives the most modern and
general version of that theory.
The equity premium puzzle
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The left-hand side is the Sharpe ratio. As I
showed above, the (unconditional) Sharpe ratio
is about 0.5 for the stock market, and it is robust
to leveraging or choice of assets. The right-hand
side of equation 6 says something very impor-
tant. A high Sharpe ratio or risk premium must
be the result of 1) high aversion to risk, g, or 2)
lots of risk, s(Dc). Furthermore, it can only occur
for assets whose returns are correlated with the
risks. This basic message will pervade the follow-
ing discussion of much-generalized economic
models. If the right-hand side of equation 6 is
low, then the consumer should invest more in
the asset with return r. Doing so will make the
consumption stream more risky and more corre-
lated with the asset return. Thus, as the consumer
invests more, the right-hand side of equation 6
will approach the left-hand side.
The right-hand side of equation 6 is a pre-
diction of what the Sharpe ratio should be. It
does not come close to predicting the historical
equity premium. The standard deviation of
aggregate consumption growth is about 1 percent
or 0.01. The correlation of consumption growth
with stock returns is a bit harder to measure
since it depends on horizon and timing issues.
Still, for horizons of a year or so, 0.2 is a pretty
generous number. g 1 or 2 is standard; g = 10
is a very generous value. Putting this all together,
10 ´ 0.01 ´ 0.2 = 0.02 rather than 0.5. At a
20 percent standard deviation, a 0.02 Sharpe
ratio implies an average excess return for
stocks of 0.02 ´ 20 = 0.4% (40 basis points)
rather than 8 percent.
This devastating calculation is the celebrated
“equity premium puzzle” of Mehra and Prescott
(1985), as reinterpreted by Hansen and Jagan-
nathan (1991). The failure is quantitative not
qualitative, as Kocherlakota (1996) points out.
Qualitatively, the right-hand side of equation 6
does predict a positive equity premium. The
problem is in the numbers. This is a strong
advertisement for quantitative rather than just
qualitative economics.
Can we change the numbers?
The correlation of consumption growth
with returns is the most suspicious ingredient
in this calculation. While the correlation is
undeniably low in the short run, a decade-long
rise in the stock market should certainly lead to
more consumption. In fact, the low correlation
is somewhat of a puzzle in itself: Standard (one-
shock) models typically predict correlations of
0.99 or more. Marshall and Daniel  (1997) find
correlations in the data up to 0.4 at a two-year
horizon, and by allowing lags. But even plugging
in a correlation of corr(Dc,r) = 1, s(Dc) = 0.01
and g < 10 implies a Sharpe ratio less than 0.1, or
one-fifth the sample value.
A large literature has tried to explain the
equity premium puzzle by introducing frictions
that make T-bills “money-like,” which artifi-
cially drive down the interest rate (for example,
Aiyagari and Gertler, 1991). The highest Sharpe
ratio occurs in fact when one considers short-
term risk-free debt and money, since the latter
pays no interest. Perhaps the same mechanism
can be invoked for the spread between stocks
and bonds. However, a glance at figure 1 shows
that this will not work. High Sharpe ratios are
pervasive in financial markets. One can recover
a high Sharpe ratio from stocks alone, or from
stocks less long-term bonds.
Time-varying expected returns
The consumption-based view with
u¢(C) = C-g also has trouble explaining the fact
that P/D ratios forecast stock returns. Consider
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where Et, st , corrt represent conditional moments.
I showed above that the P/D ratio gives a strong
signal about mean returns, Et(r). It does not
however give much information about the
standard deviation of returns. Figure 5 does
suggest a slight increase in return standardECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16
deviation along with the higher mean return
when P/D ratios decline—the leverage effect
of Black (1976). However, the increase in
standard deviation is much less than the increase
in mean return. Hence, the Sharpe ratio of mean
to standard deviation varies over time and
increases when prices are low.
How can we explain variation in the Sharpe
ratio? Looking at equation 7, it could happen if
there were times of high and low consumption
volatility, variation in st(Dc). But that does not
seem to be the case; there is little evidence that
aggregate consumption growth is much more
volatile at times of low prices than high prices.
The conditional correlation of consumption
growth and returns could vary a great deal
over time, but this seems unlikely, or more
precisely like an unfathomable assumption
on which to build the central understanding
of time-varying returns.
What about the CAPM?
Finance researchers and practitioners often
express disbelief (and boredom) with consump-
tion-based models such as the above. Even the
CAPM performs better: Expected returns of
different portfolios such as those in figure 1 line
up much better against their covariances with
the market return than against their covariances
with consumption growth. Why not use the
CAPM or other, better-performing finance models
to understand the equity premium?
The answer is that the CAPM and related
finance models are useless for understanding the
market premium. The CAPM states that the ex-
pected return of a given asset is proportional to its
“beta” times the expected return of the market,
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This is fine if you want to think about an
individual stock’s return given the market
return. But the average market return—the
thing we are trying to explain, understand, and
predict—is a given to the CAPM. Similarly,
multifactor models explain average returns on
individual assets, given average returns on
“factor mimicking portfolios,” including the
market. Option pricing models explain option
prices, given the stock price. To understand the
market premium, there is no substitute for eco-
nomic models such as the consumption-based
model outlined above and its variants.
Highly curved power utility
Since we have examined all the other
numbers on the right-hand side of equation 6,
perhaps we should raise curvature g. This is a
central modification. All of macroeconomics
and growth theory considers values of g no
larger than 2–3. To generate a Sharpe ratio of
0.5,  g = 250 is needed in equation 6. Even if
corr = 1, g must still equal 50. What’s wrong
with g = 50 to 250? Although a high curvature
g explains the equity premium, it runs quickly
into trouble with other facts.
Consumption and interest rates
The most basic piece of evidence for low g
is the relationship between consumption growth
and interest rates. Real interest rates are quite
stable over time (see the standard deviation in
table 1) and roughly the same the world over,
despite wide variation in consumption growth
over time and across countries. A value of g = 50
to 250 implies that consumers are essentially
unwilling to substitute consumption over time;
equivalently that variation in consumption
growth must be accompanied by huge variations
in interest rates that we do not observe.
Look again at the first basic relationship
between consumption growth and interest
rates, equation 4, reproduced here:
rE c t
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High values of g are troublesome even in
understanding the level of interest rates. Aver-
age consumption growth and real interest rates
are both about 1 percent. Thus, g = 50 to 250
requires r = –0.5 to –2.5, or a –50 percent to
–250 percent subjective discount rate. That’s
the wrong sign: People should prefer current
to future consumption, not the other way
around (Weil, 1989).7
The absence of much interest rate variation
across time and countries is an even bigger
problem. People save more and defer consump-
tion in times of high interest rates, so consump-
tion growth rises when interest rates are higher.
However, g = 50 means that a country with
consumption growth 1 percentage point higher
than normal must have real interest rates 50
percentage points higher than normal, and
consumption 1 percentage point lower than
normal must have real interest rates 50 percent-
age points lower than normal, implying huge
negative interest rates—consumers pay financialFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
intermediaries 48 percent to keep their money.
This just does not happen.
This observation can also be phrased as
a conceptual experiment, suitable for thinking
about one’s own preferences or for survey
evidence on others’ preferences. For example,
what does it take to convince someone to skip
a vacation? Take a family with $50,000 per year
income, consumption equal to income, which
spends $2,500 (5 percent) on an annual vaca-
tion. If interest rates are good enough, though,
the family can be persuaded to skip this year’s
vacation and go on two vacations next year.
What interest rate does it take to persuade the
family to do this? The answer is ($52,500/
$47,500)g – 1. For g = 250 that is an interest
rate of 3 ´ 1011. For g = 50, we still need an
interest rate of 14,800 percent. I think most of
us would defer the vacation for somewhat
lower interest rates.
The standard use of low values for g in
macroeconomics is also important for delivering
realistic quantity dynamics in macroeconomic
models, including relative variances of invest-
ment and output, and for delivering reasonable
speeds of adjustment to shocks.
Risk aversion
Economists have also shied away from high
curvature g on the basis that people do not
seem that risk averse. After examining the
argument, I conclude that there are fewer solid
reasons to object to high risk aversion than to
object to high aversion to intertemporal substi-
tution via the consumption-interest rate relation-
ships I examined above.
Surveys and thought experiments
Since Sharpe ratios are high for many
assets, much analysis of risk aversion comes
from simple thought experiments
rather than data. For example, how
much would a family pay per year
to avoid a bet that led with equal
probability to a $y increase or de-
crease in annual consumption for
the rest of their lives? Table 6
presents some calculations of how
much our family with $50,000 per
year of income and consumption
would pay to avoid various bets of
this form.8 For bets that are reason-
ably large relative to wealth, high g
means that families are willing to
pay almost the entire amount of the
bet to avoid taking it. For example, in the low-
er right-hand corner, the family with g = 250
would rather pay $9,889 for sure than take a
50 percent chance of a $10,000 loss. This predic-
tion is surely unreasonable, and has led most
authors to rule out risk aversion coefficients
over ten. Survey evidence for this kind of bet
also finds low risk aversion, certainly below g = 5
(Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro, 1997), and
even negative risk aversion if the survey is taken
in Las Vegas.
Yet the results for small bets are not so unrea-
sonable. The family might reasonably pay 5 cents
to 25 cents to avoid a $10 bet. We are all risk
neutral for small enough bets. For small bets,
amount willing to pay to avoid bet




Thus, for any g, the amount one is willing
to pay is an arbitrarily small fraction of the bet
for small enough bets. For this reason, it is
easy to cook numbers of conceptual experi-
ments like table 6 by varying the size of the bet
and the presumed wealth of the family. Signifi-
cantly, I only used local curvature above; g
represented the derivative g = –Cu²(C)/u¢(C).
In asking how much the family would pay to
avoid a $10,000 bet, we are asking for the
response to a very, very non-local event.
The main lesson of conceptual experiments
and laboratory and survey evidence of simple
bets is that people’s answers to such questions
routinely violate expected utility. This observa-
tion lowers the value of this source of evidence
as a measurement of risk aversion. As a similar
cautionary note, Barsky et al. report that whether
an individual partakes in a wide variety of
risky activities correlates poorly with the level
Amount family would pay to avoid an even bet
TABLE 6
Risk aversion g g g g g
Bet 2 10 50 100 250
$10 $0.00 $0.01 $0.05 $0.10 $0.25
100 0.20 1.00 4.99 9.94 24
1,000 20 99 435 665 863
10,000 2,000 6,921 9,430 9,718 9,889
Notes: I assume the family has a constant $50,000 per year
consumption and an even chance of winning or losing the
indicated net, per year.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18
of risk aversion inferred from a survey. In the
end, surveys about hypothetical bets that are
far from the range of everyday experience are
hard to interpret.
Microeconomic evidence
Microeconomic observations might be a
more useful measure of risk aversion, that is,
evidence from people’s actual behavior in their
daily activities. For example, the numbers in
table 6 could be matched with insurance data.
People are willing to pay substantially more
than actuarially fair values to insure against car
theft or house fires. What is the implied risk
aversion? But even if there are other markets
whose prices reflect less risk aversion than
stocks, this leaves open the question: If people
are risk-neutral in other markets, why do they
become risk averse in the stockbroker’s office?
Perhaps the risk aversion people display in the
stock broker’s office should be the fact and the
(possibly) low risk aversion displayed in other
offices should be the puzzle.
Portfolio calculations
A common calibration of risk aversion
comes from simple portfolio calculations
(see Friend and Blume, 1975). Following the
principle that the last dollar spent should give
the same increase in happiness in any alterna-
tive use, the marginal value of wealth should
equal the marginal utility of consumption,9
VW(W,.) = uc(C). Therefore, if we assume returns
are independent over time and no other vari-
ables are important for the marginal value of


















The quantity –WWWW/VW is in fact a better
measure of risk aversion than –Cucc/uc, since it
represents aversion to bets over wealth rather
than bets over consumption; most bets observed
are paid off in dollars. For a consumer who
invests entirely in stocks, s(Dw) is the standard
deviation of the stock return and corr(Dw,r) =
1. To generate a Sharpe ratio of 0.5, it seems













The Achilles heel of this calculation is the
hidden simplifying assumption that returns are
independent over time, so no variables other
than wealth show up in VW. If this were the case,
consumption would move one-for-one with
wealth, and s(Dc) = s(Dw). If wealth doubles
and nothing else has changed, the consumer
would double consumption. The calculation,
therefore, hides a model with the drastically
counterfactual implication that consumption
growth has a 17 percent standard deviation!
The fact that consumption has a standard
deviation so much lower than that of stock
returns suggests that returns are not indepen-
dent over time (as is already known from the
return on P/D regressions) and/or that other
state variables must be important in driving
stock returns. If some other state variable, z,
is allowed—representing subsequent expected
returns, labor income, or some other measure
of a consumer’s overall opportunities—the
substitution VW(W,z) = uc(C) in equation 6 adds
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The Sharpe ratio may be driven not by consum-
ers’ risk aversion and the wealth-riskiness of
stocks, but by stocks’ exposure to other risks.
In the current context, this observation just
tells us that portfolio-based calibrations of risk
aversion do not work, because they implicitly
assume independent returns and, hence, con-
sumption growth as volatile as returns. Below,
I introduce plausible candidates for the variable z
that can help us to understand high Sharpe
ratios. The fact that consumption is so much
less volatile than shock returns indicates that
the other state variables must account for the
bulk of the equity premium.
Overall, the evidence against high risk
aversion is not that strong, and it is at least a
possibility to consider. This argument does not
rescue the power utility model with g = 50 to
250—that ship sank on the consumption-interest
rate shoals. However, other models with high
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New utility functions and state variables
If changing the parameter g in u¢(C) = C-g
does not work, perhaps we need to change the
functional form. Changing the form of u(C)
is not a promising avenue. As I have stressed
by using a continuous time derivation, only the
derivatives of u(C) really matter; hence quite
similar results are achieved with other functional
forms. A more promising avenue is to consider
other arguments of the utility function, or
nonseparabilities.
Perhaps how people feel about eating more
today is affected not just by how much they are
already eating, but by other things, such as how
much they ate yesterday or how much they
worked today. Then, the covariance of stock
returns with these other variables will also
determine the equity premium. Fundamentally,
consumers use assets to smooth marginal utility.
Perhaps today’s marginal utility is related to
more than just today’s consumption.
Such a modification is a fundamental change
in how we view stock market risk. For example,
perhaps more leisure raises the marginal utility
of consumption. Stocks are then feared because
they pay off badly in recessions when employ-
ment is lower and leisure is higher, not because
consumers are particularly averse to the risk
that stocks decline per se. Formally, our funda-
mental equation 6 is derived from
Er r ur tt
f
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and substituting uc = ¶u(c)/¶c. If I substitute uc
= ¶u(c,x)/¶c instead, then uc will depend on
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Since the first covariance does not account for
much premium, we will have to rely heavily on
the latter term to explain the premium.
There is a practical aim to generalizing the
utility function as well. As illustrated in the
last section, one parameter g did two things
with power utility: It controlled how much
people are willing to substitute consumption
over time (consumption and interest rates) and
it controlled their attitudes toward risk. The
choice g = 50 to 250 was clearly a crazy repre-
sentation of how people feel about consump-
tion variation over time, but perhaps not so
bad a representation of risk aversion. Maybe
a modification of preferences can disentangle
the two attitudes.
State separability and leisure
With the latter end in mind, Epstein and Zin
(1989) started an avalanche of academic research
on utility functions that relax state-separability.
The expectation E in the utility function of equa-
tion 3 sums over states of nature, for example
U prob u C prob
uC




“Separability” means that one adds utility
across states, so the marginal utility of con-
sumption in one state is unaffected by what
happens in another state. But perhaps the mar-
ginal utility of a little more consumption in the
sunny state of the world is affected by the level
of consumption in the rainy state of the world.
Epstein and Zin and Hansen, Sargent, and
Tallarini (1997) propose recursive utility func-
tions of the form
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If f(x) = x, this expression reduces to power
utility. These utility functions are not state-
separable, and do conveniently distinguish risk
aversion from intertemporal substitution among
other modifications. However, this research is
only starting to pay off in terms of plausible
models that explain the facts (Campbell, 1996,
is an example) so I will not review it here.
Perhaps leisure is the most natural extra
variable to add to a utility function. It is not
clear a priori whether more leisure enhances
the marginal utility of consumption (why bother
buying a boat if you are at the office all day
and cannot use it?) or vice versa (if you have to
work all day, it is more important to come
home to a really nice big TV), but we can let
the data speak on this matter. However, explicit
versions of this approach have not been very
successful to date. (Eichenbaum, Hansen, and
Singleton, 1988, for example). On the other
hand, recent research has found that adding
labor income growth as an extra ad-hoc factor
can be useful in explaining the cross section of
average stock returns (Jagannathan and Wang,
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by an explicit utility function, the facts in
this research may in the future be interpretable
as an effect of leisure on the marginal utility
of consumption.
Force of habit
Nonseparabilities over time have been more
useful in empirical work. Anyone who has had a
large pizza dinner knows that yesterday’s con-
sumption can have an impact on today’s appetite.
Might a similar mechanism apply over a longer
time horizon? Perhaps people get accustomed
to a standard of living, so a fall in consumption
hurts after a few years of good times, even though
the same level of consumption might have seemed
very pleasant if it arrived after years of bad times.
This view at least explains the perception that
recessions are awful events, even though a
recession year may be just the second or third
best year in human history rather than the abso-
lute best. Law, custom, and social insurance
insure against falls in consumption as much as
low levels of consumption.
Following this idea, Campbell and Cochrane
(1997) specify that people slowly develop habits
for higher or lower consumption. Technically,
they replace the utility function u(C) with
9
1 )( ) ( ) , uC X C X -=-
-h
where X represents the level of habits. In turn,
habit X adjusts slowly to the level of consump-
tion.10 (I use the symbol h for the power, because
curvature and risk aversion no longer equal h.)
This specification builds on a long tradition in
the microeconomic literature (Duesenberry, 1949,
and Deaton, 1992) and recent asset-pricing litera-
ture (Constantinides, 1990; Ferson and Constan-
tinides, 1991; Heaton, 1995; and Abel, 1990).
When a consumer has such a habit, local
curvature depends on how far consumption is















As consumption falls toward habit, people
become much less willing to tolerate further
falls in consumption; they become very risk
averse. Thus, a low power coefficient h
(Campbell and Cochrane use h = 2) can still
mean a high and time-varying curvature.















High curvature gt means that the model can
explain the equity premium, and curvature that
varies over time, as consumption rises
in booms and falls toward habit in recessions,
means that the model can explain a time-varying
and countercyclical (high in recessions, low in
booms) Sharpe ratio, despite constant con-
sumption volatility, st(Dc), and correlation,
corrt(Dc,r).
So far so good, but doesn’t raising curva-
ture imply high and time-varying interest rates?
In the Campbell-Cochrane model, the answer
is no. The reason is precautionary saving. Sup-
pose times are bad and consumption is low
relative to habit. People want to borrow against
future, higher consumption and this should
drive up interest rates. However, people are
also much more risk averse in bad times; they
want to save more in case tomorrow might be
even worse. These two effects balance.
The precautionary saving motive also
makes the model more plausibly consistent
with variation in consumption growth across
time and countries. The interest rate in the
model adds a precautionary savings motive
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 denotes the steady state value of
(C–X)/C, about 0.05. The power coefficient,
h = 2, controls the relationship between con-
sumption growth and interest rates, while the
curvature coefficient, g = h C/(C–X), controls
the risk premium. Thus, this habit model allows
high risk aversion with low aversion to inter-
temporal substitution and is consistent with
the consumption and interest rate data and a
sensible value of r.
Campbell and Cochrane create a simple
artificial economy with these preferences.
Consumption growth is independent over time
and real interest rates are constant. They calcu-
late time series of stock prices and interest ratesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 21
in the artificial economy and subject them to
the standard statistical analysis reviewed above.
The artificial data replicate the equity premium
(0.5 Sharpe ratio). The ability to forecast returns
from the P/D ratio and the P/D variance decom-
position are both quite like the actual data. The
standard deviation of returns rises a bit when
prices decline, but less than the rise in mean
returns, so a low P/D ratio forecasts a higher
Sharpe ratio. Artificial data from the model
also replicate much of the low observed correla-
tion between consumption growth and returns,
and the CAPM and ad-hoc multifactor models
perform better than the power utility consump-
tion-based model in the artificial data.
The model also provides a good account
of P/D fluctuations over the last century, based
entirely on the history of consumption. Howev-
er, it does not account for the currently high
P/D ratio. This is because the model generates
a high P/D ratio when consumption is very
high relative to habit and, therefore, risk aver-
sion is low. Measured consumption has been
increasing unusually slowly in the 1990s.
Like other models that explain the equity
premium and return predictability, this one
does so by fundamentally changing the story
of why consumers are afraid of holding stocks.
From equation 9, the marginal utility of con-
















Thus, consumers dislike low consumption
as before, but they are also afraid of recessions,
times when consumption, whatever its level, is
low relative to the recent past as described by
habits. Consumers are afraid of holding stocks
not because they fear the wealth or consumption
volatility per se, but because bad stock returns
tend to happen in recessions, times of a recent
belt-tightening.
This model fulfills a decade-long search
kicked off by Mehra and Prescott (1985). It is
a complete-markets, frictionless economy that
replicates not only the equity premium but also
the predictability of returns, the nearly constant
interest rate, and the near-random walk behavior
of consumption.
Habit models with low risk aversion
The individuals in the Campbell-Cochrane
model are highly risk averse. They would respond
to surveys about bets on wealth much as the
g = 50 column of table 6. The model does not
give rise to a high equity premium with low
risk aversion; it merely disentangles risk aver-
sion and intertemporal substitution so that a
high risk aversion economy can be consistent
with low and constant interest rates, and it
generates the predictability of stock returns.
Constantinides (1990) and Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher (1995) explore habit
persistence models that can generate a large
equity premium without large risk aversion.
That is, they create artificial economies in
which consumers simultaneously shy away
from stocks with a very attractive Sharpe ratio
of 0.5, yet would happily take bets with much
lower rewards.
Suppose a consumer wins a bet or enjoys
a high stock return. Normally, the consumer
would instantly raise consumption to match
the new higher wealth level. But consumption
is addictive in these models: Too much current
consumption will raise the future habit level
and blunt the enjoyment of future consumption.
Therefore, the consumer increases consumption
slowly and predictably after the increase in
wealth. Similarly, the consumer would borrow
to slowly decrease consumption after a decline
in wealth, avoiding the pain of a sudden loss at
the cost of lower long-term consumption.
The fact that the consumer will choose to
spread out the consumption response to wealth
shocks means that the consumer is not averse
to wealth bets. If consumption responds little
to a wealth shock, then marginal utility of
consumption, uc(C), also responds little, as does
the marginal value of wealth, VW(W,×) = uc. Risk
aversion to wealth bets is measured by the
change of marginal utility when wealth changes
(¶ln VW/¶lnW = –WVWW/VW).
The argument is correct, but shows the
problem with these models. The change in
consumption in response to wealth is not elimi-
nated, it is simply deferred. Thus, these models
have trouble with long-run behavior of con-
sumption and asset returns.
If consumption growth is considered inde-
pendent over time (formally, an endowment
economy), which is a good approximation to
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rate variation to keep consumers from trying to
adapt consumption smoothly to wealth shocks.
For example, consumers all want to save if
wealth goes up, thereby slowly increasing
consumption. For consumption growth to remain
unpredictable, we must have a strong decline
in the interest rate at the same time as the wealth
increase. Of course, interest rates are in fact
quite stable and, if anything, slightly positively
correlated with stock returns.
Alternatively, interest rates may be fixed
to be constant over time as in Constantinides
(1990) (formally, linear technologies). But
then there is no force to stop consumers from
slowly and predictably raising consumption
after a wealth shock. Thus, such models predict
counterfactually that consumption growth is
positively auto-correlated over time, and that
long-run consumption growth shares the high
volatility of long- and short-run wealth.
The Campbell-Cochrane habit model
avoids these long-run problems with precau-
tionary savings. In response to a wealth shock,
consumers with the Campbell-Cochrane version
of habit persistence would also like to save
more for intertemporal substitution reasons,
but they also feel less risk averse and so want
to save less for precautionary savings reasons.
The balance means that consumption can be a
random walk with constant interest rates, con-
sistent with the data. However, it means that
consumption does move right away, so uc and
VW are affected by the wealth shock, and the
consumers are highly risk averse. In this model,
wealth (stock prices) comes back toward con-
sumption after a shock, so that long-run wealth
shares the low volatility of long- and short-run
consumption, and high stock prices forecast
low subsequent returns.
A finance perspective
To get a high equity premium with low
risk aversion, we need to find some crucial
characteristic that separates stock returns from
wealth bets. This is a difficult task. After all,
what are stocks if not a bet? The answer must
be some additional state variable. Having a
stock pay off badly must tell you additional
bad news that losing a bet does not; therefore,
people shy away from stocks even though they
would happily take a bet with the same mean
and variance.
In the context of perfect-markets models
without leisure or other goods, the only real
candidates for extra state variables are vari-
ables that describe changes in expected returns.
If stock prices rise, the consumer learns some-
thing important that is not learned from winning
a bet: The consumer learns that future stock
returns are going to be lower. The trouble is
the sign of this relationship. Lower returns in
the future are bad news.11 Stocks act as a hedge
for this bad news; they go up just at the time
one gets bad news about future returns. This
consideration makes stocks more desirable than
pure bets. Thus, considering time variation in
expected returns requires even more risk aver-
sion to explain the equity premium.
Consistency with individual
consumption behavior
The low risk aversion models face one
more important hurdle: microeconomic data.
Suppose an individual receives a wealth shock
(wins the lottery), not shared by everyone else.
For aggregate wealth shocks, we could appeal
to interest rate variation to avoid the prediction
that consumption would grow slowly and pre-
dictably. However, interest rates can’t change
in response to an individual wealth shock.
Thus, we are stuck with the prediction that the
individual’s consumption will increase slowly
and predictably. The huge literature on individ-
ual consumption (see Deaton, 1992, for survey
and references) almost unanimously finds the
opposite. People who receive windfalls consume
too much, too soon, and have typically spent it
all in a few years. The literature abounds with
“liquidity constraints” to explain the “excess
sensitivity” of consumption. The Campbell-
Cochrane model avoids the prediction of slowly
increasing consumption by specifying an external
habit; each person’s habit responds to everyone
else’s consumption, related to the need to
“keep up with the Joneses,” as advocated by
Abel (1990). Though the external specification
has little impact on aggregate consumption and
prices, it means that individual consumption
responds fully and immediately to individual
wealth shocks, because there is no need for
individuals to worry about habit formation.
The downside is, again, high risk aversion.
In the end, there is currently no representa-
tive agent model with low risk aversion that is
consistent with the equity premium, the stability
of real interest rates, nearly unpredictable con-
sumption growth, and return predictability of
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Heterogeneous agents and
idiosyncratic risks
In the above discussion, I did not recog-
nize any difference between people. Everyone
is different, so why bother looking at represen-
tative agent or complete market models? While
making an assumption such as “all people are
identical” seems obviously foolish, it is not
foolish to hope that we can use aggregate
behavior to make sense of aggregate data,
without explicitly taking account of the differ-
ences between people. While differences are
there, one hopes they are not relevant to the
basic story. However, seeing the difficulties
that representative agent models face, perhaps
it is time to see if the (aggregate) equity premium
does in fact surface from differences between
people rather than common behavior.
The empirical hurdle
Idiosyncratic risk explanations face a big
empirical challenge. Look again at the basic
Sharpe ratio equation 6,
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This relationship should hold for every (any)
consumer or household. At first sight, thinking
about individuals seems promising. After all,
individual consumption is certainly more vari-
able than aggregate consumption at 1 percent
per year, so we can raise s(Dc). However, this
argument fails quantitatively. First, it is incon-
ceivable that we can raise s(Dc) enough to
account for the equity premium. For example,
even if individual consumption has a standard
deviation of 10 percent per year, and maintain-
ing a generous limit g < 10, we still predict a
Sharpe ratio no more than 10 ´ 0.1 ´ 0.2 = 0.2.
To explain the 0.5 Sharpe ratio with risk aver-
sion g = 10, we have to believe that individual
consumption growth has a 25 percent per year
standard deviation; for a more traditional g = 2.5,
we need 100 percent per year standard devia-
tion. Even 10 percent per year is a huge standard
deviation of consumption growth. Remember,
we are considering the risky or uncertain part of
consumption growth. Predictable increases or
decreases in consumption due to age and life-
cycle effects, expected raises, and so on do not
count. We are also thinking of the flow of
consumption (nondurable goods, services) not
the much more variable purchases of durable
goods, such as cars and houses.
More fundamentally, the addition of idio-
syncratic risk lowers the correlation between
consumption growth and returns, which lowers
the predicted Sharpe ratio. Idiosyncratic risk is,
by its nature, idiosyncratic. If it happened to
everyone, it would be aggregate risk. Idiosyn-
cratic risk cannot therefore be correlated with
the stock market, since the stock market return
is the same for everyone.
For a quantitative example, suppose that
individual consumption of family i, Dci, is deter-
mined by aggregate consumption, Dca, and idio-
syncratic shocks (such as losing your job), ei,
DD cc
ia i =+ e .
For the risk ei to average to zero across people,
we must have E(ei) = 0 and E(ei½Dca) = E(ei½r)
= 0. Then, the standard deviation of individual
consumption growth does increase with the
size of idiosyncratic risk,
s s s e
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But the correlation between individual con-
sumption growth and aggregate returns de-
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Therefore, the equity premium is completely
unaffected by idiosyncratic risk.
The theoretical hurdles
The theoretical challenge to idiosyncratic
risk explanations is even more severe. We can
easily construct models in which consumers
are given lots of idiosyncratic income risk.
But it is very hard to keep consumers from
insuring themselves against those risks, pro-
ducing a very steady consumption stream and
a low equity premium.
Start by handing out income to consum-
ers; call it “labor income” and make it risky
by adding a chance of being fired. Left to
their own devices, consumers would come
up with unemployment insurance to share
this risk, so we have to close down or limit
markets for labor income insurance. Then,ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
consumers who lose their jobs will borrow
against future income to smooth consumption
over the bad times, achieving almost the same
consumption smoothness. We must shut down
these markets too.
However, nothing stops our borrowing-
constrained consumers from saving. They build
up a stock of durable goods, government
bonds, or other liquid assets that they can draw
down in bad times and again achieve a very
smooth consumption stream (Telmer, 1993,
and Lucas, 1994). To shut down this avenue
for consumption-smoothing, we can introduce
large transactions costs and ban from the model
the simple accumulation of durable goods.
Alternatively, we can make idiosyncratic
shocks permanent, because borrowing and saving
can only insure against transitory income. If
losing your job means losing it forever, there
is no point in borrowing and planning to pay it
back when you get a new job.
Heaton and Lucas (1996a) put all these
ingredients together, calibrating the persistence
of labor income shocks from microeconomic
data. They also allow the cross-sectional variance
of shocks to increase in a downturn, a very
helpful ingredient suggested by Mankiw (1986)
that I discuss in detail in the next section. Despite
all of these ingredients, their model explains at
best one-half of the observed excess average
stock return (and this much only with no net
debt). It also predicts counterfactually that
interest rates are as volatile as stock returns,
and that individuals have huge (10 percent to 30
percent, depending on specification) consump-
tion growth uncertainty.
A model that works
Constantinides and Duffie (1996) con-
struct a model in which idiosyncratic risk can
be tailored to generate any pattern of aggregate
consumption and asset prices; it can generate
the equity premium, predictability, relatively
constant interest rates, smooth and unpredict-
able aggregate consumption growth, and so
forth. Furthermore, it requires no transactions
costs, borrowing constraints, or other frictions,
and the individual consumers can have any
nonzero value of risk aversion.
As mentioned earlier, if consumers are
given idiosyncratic income that is correlated
with the market return, they will trade away
that risk. Constantinides and Duffie therefore
specify that the variance of idiosyncratic risk
rises when the market declines. Variance cannot
be traded away. In addition, if marginal utility
were linear, an increase in variance would have
no effect on the average level of marginal utili-
ty. The interaction of cross-sector variance
correlated with the market and nonlinear mar-
ginal utility produces an equity premium.
The Constantinides-Duffie model and the
Campbell-Cochrane model are quite similar in
spirit, though the Constantinides-Duffie model
is built on incomplete markets and idiosyncratic
risks, while the Campbell-Cochrane model is
in the representative-agent frictionless and
complete market tradition.
First, both models make a similar, funda-
mental change in the description of stock market
risk. Consumers do not fear the loss of wealth
of a bad market return so much as they fear a
bad return in a recession, in one model a time
of heightened labor market risk and in the other
a fall of consumption relative to the recent past.
This recession state variable or risk factor drives
most expected returns.
Second, both models require high risk aver-
sion. While Constantinides and Duffie’s proof
shows that one can dream up a labor income
process to rationalize the equity premium for any
risk aversion coefficient, I argue below that even
vaguely plausible characterizations of actual
labor income uncertainty will require high risk
aversion to explain the historical equity premium.
Third, both models provide long-sought
demonstrations that it is possible to rationalize
the equity premium in their respective class
of models. This is particularly impressive
in Constantinides and Duffie’s case. Many
researchers (myself included) had come to the
conclusion that the effort to generate an equity
premium from idiosyncratic risk was hopeless.
The open question in both cases is empirical.
The stories are consistent; are they right? For
Constantinides and Duffie, does actual individ-
ual labor income behave as their model requires
in order to generate the equity premium? The
empirical work remains to be done, but here
are some of the issues.
A simple version of the model







Individual consumption growth, Cit, is deter-
mined by an independent, idiosyncratic normal















where yt is the cross-sectional standard devia-
tion of consumption growth at any moment in
time. yt is specified so that a low market return,



































Since hit determines consumption growth,
the idiosyncratic shocks are permanent, which
I argued above was important to keep consumers
from smoothing them away.
Given this structure, the individual is
exactly happy to consume Cit and hold the
stock (we can call Cit income Iit and prove the
optimal decision rule is to set Cit = Iit.). The




























The actual Constantinides-Duffie model
is much more general than the above example.
They show that the idiosyncratic risk can be
constructed to price exactly a large collection
of assets, not just one return as in the example,
and they allow uncertainty in aggregate con-
sumption. Therefore, they can tailor the idio-
syncratic risk to exactly match the Sharpe
ratio, return forecastability, and consumption-
interest rate facts as outlined above.


















where mt is a strictly positive discount factor13
that prices all assets under consideration. That
is, mt satisfies















Following exactly the same argument in the

























for all the assets priced by m.
Microeconomic evaluation and risk aversion
Like the Campbell-Cochrane model, this
model could be either a new view of stock
market (and macroeconomic) risk or just a
theoretically interesting existence proof. The
first question is whether the microeconomic
picture painted by this model is correct, or even
plausible. Is idiosyncratic risk large enough?
Does idiosyncratic risk really rise when the
market falls, and enough to account for the
equity premium? Do people really shy away
from stocks because stock returns are low at
times of high labor market risk?
This model does not change the empirical
puzzle discussed earlier. To get power utility
consumers to shun stocks, they still must have
tremendously volatile consumption growth or
high risk aversion. The point of this model is to
show how consumers can get stuck with high
consumption volatility in equilibrium, already
a difficult task.
More seriously than volatility itself, con-
sumption growth variance also represents the
amount by which the distribution of individual
consumption and income spreads out over time,
since the shocks must be permanent and inde-
pendent across people. The 10 percent to 50
percent volatility (s(Dc)) that is required to
reconcile the Sharpe ratio with low risk aver-
sion means that the distribution of consump-
tion (and income) must also spread out by 10
percent to 50 percent per year.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
Constantinides and Duffie show how to
avoid the implication that the overall distribu-
tion of income spreads out, by limiting inherit-
ance and repopulating the economy each year
with new generations that are born equal. But
the distribution of consumption must still spread
out within each generation to achieve the equity
premium with low risk aversion. Is this plausi-
ble? Deaton and Paxson (1994) report that the
cross-sectional variance of log consumption
within an age cohort rises from about 0.2 at
age 20 to 0.6 at age 60. This means that the
cross-sectional standard deviation of consump-
tion rises from  02 .  = 0.45 or 45 percent at age
20 to  06 .  = 0.77 or 77 percent at age 60 (77
percent means that an individual one standard
deviation better off than the mean consumes
77 percent more than the mean consumer).
This works out to about 1 percent per year,
not 10 percent or so.
Finally, the cross-sectional uncertainty
about individual income must not only be
large, it must be higher when the market is
lower. This risk factor is after all the central
element of Constantinides and Duffie’s expla-
nation for the market premium. Figure 6 shows
how the cross-sectional standard deviation of
consumption growth varies with the market
return and risk aversion in my simple version
of Constantinides and Duffie’s model. If we
insist on low (g = 1 to 2) risk aversion, the
cross-sectional standard deviation of consump-
tion growth must be extremely sensitive to the
level of the market return. Looking at the g = 2
line for example, is it plausible that a year with
5 percent market return would show a 10 percent
cross-sectional variation in consumption
growth, while a mild 5 percent decline in the
market is associated with a 25 percent cross-
sectional variation?
The Heaton and Lucas (1996a) model can
be regarded as an empirical assessment of these
issues. Rather than constructing a labor income
process that generates an equity premium, they
calibrated the labor income process from
microeconomic data. They found less persis-
tence and less increase in cross-sectional varia-
tion with a low market return than specified by
Constantinides and Duffie, which is why their
model predicts a low equity premium with low
risk aversion. Of course, this view is at best
preliminary evidence. They did not test the
exact Constantinides-Duffie specification as a
special case, nor did they test whether one can
reject the Constantinides-Duffie specification.
All of these empirical problems are avoided
if we allow high risk aversion
rather than a large risk to drive
the equity premium. The g = 25
line in figure 6 looks possible; a
g = 50 line would look even
better. With high risk aversion,
we do not need to specify highly
volatile individual consumption
growth, spreading out of the
income distribution, or dramatic
sensitivity of the cross-sectional
variance to the market return. As
in any model, a high equity
premium must come from a
large risk, or from large risk
aversion. Labor market risk
correlated with the stock market
does not seem large enough to
account for the equity premium
without high risk aversion.
Segmented markets
All these models try to
answer the basic question, if
stocks are so attractive, why
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Notes: Cross-sectional standard deviation of individual consumption growth
as a function of the market return in the Constantinides-Duffie model.
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them? So far, I have tried to find representations
of people’s preferences or circumstances, or a
description of macroeconomic risk, in which
stocks aren’t that attractive after all. Then the
high Sharpe ratio is a compensation for risk.
Instead, we could argue that stocks really
are attractive, but a variety of market frictions
keep people from buying them. This approach
yields some important insights. First of all,
stock ownership has been quite concentrated.
The vast majority of American households have
not directly owned any stock or mutual funds.
One might ask whether the consumption of
people who do own stock lines up with stock
returns. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find that
stockholders do have consumption that is more
volatile and more correlated with stock returns
than non-stockholders. But it is still not volatile
and correlated enough to satisfy the right-hand
side of equation 6 with low risk aversion.
Heaton and Lucas (1996b) look at individual
asset and income data. They find that the richest
households, who own most of the stocks, also
get most of their income from proprietary
business income. This income is likely to be
more correlated with the stock market than is
individual labor income. Furthermore, they
find that among rich households, those with
more proprietary income hold fewer stocks
in their portfolios. This paints an interesting
picture of the equity premium: In the past
most stocks were held by rich people, and
most rich people were proprietors whose other
income (and consumption) was quite volatile
and covaried strongly with the market. This is
a hard crowd to sell stocks to, so they have
required a high risk premium. The Campbell-
Cochrane and Constantinides-Duffie models
specify that stock market risk is spread as
evenly as possible through the population,
whereas if the risk is shared among a small
group of people, higher rewards will have to
be offered to offset that risk.
These views are still not sorted out quanti-
tatively. We don’t know why rich stockholders
don’t buy even more stocks, given low risk
aversion and the tyrannical logic of equation 6.
We don’t know why only rich people held
stocks in the first place: The literature shows
that even quite high transactions costs and
borrowing constraints should not be enough
to deter people with low risk aversion from
holding stocks.
If these segmented market views of the
past equity premium are correct, they suggest
that the future equity premium will be much
lower. Transaction costs are declining through
financial deregulation and innovation. The
explosion in tax-deferred pension plans and
no-load mutual funds means more and more
people own stocks, spreading risks more evenly,
driving up prices, and driving down prospective
returns. Equation 6 will hold much better for the
average consumer in the future. One would expect
to see a lower equity premium. One would also
expect consumption that is more volatile and
more closely correlated with the stock market,
which will result in a fundamental change in the
nature and politics of business cycles.
Technology and investment
So far, I have tried to rationalize stock
returns from the consumer’s point of view:
Does it make sense that consumers should not
have tried to buy more stocks, driving stock
returns down toward bond returns? I can ask
the same questions for the firm: Do firms’
investment decisions line up with stock prices
as they should?
The relative prices of apples and oranges
are basically set by technology, the relative
number of apples versus oranges that can be
grown on the same acre of land. We do not
need a deep understanding of consumers’ de-
sires to figure out what the price should be. If
technology is (close to) linear, it will determine
relative prices, while preferences will deter-
mine quantities. Does this argument work for
stocks?
Again, there is a standard model that has
served well to describe quantities in growth,
macroeconomics, and international economics.
The standard model consists of a production
function by which output, Y, is made from
capital, K, and labor, L, perhaps with some
uncertainty, q, together with an accumulation
equation by which investment I turns into new
capital in the future. In equations, together
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It was well known already in the 1970s
that this standard, “neoclassical” model would
be a disaster at describing asset pricing facts.
It predicts that stock prices and returns should
be extremely stable. To see this, invest an extra
dollar, reap the extra output that the additional
capital will produce, and then invest a bit less
next year. This action gives a physical or invest-
ment return. For the technology described in























With the share of capital a » 1/3, an output-
capital ratio Y/K » 1/3, and depreciation d » 10%,
we have RI » 6%, so average equity returns are
easily within the range of plausible parameters.
The trouble lies with the variance. Capital is
quite smooth, so even if output varies 3 percent
in a year, the investment return only varies by
1 percent, far below the 17 percent standard
deviation of stock returns. The basic problem
is the absence of price variation. The capital
accumulation equation shows that installed
capital, Kt, and uninstalled capital, It, are per-
fect substitutes in making new capital, Kt+1
Therefore, they must have the same price—the
price of stocks relative to consumption goods
must be exactly 1.0.
The obvious modification is that there
must be some difference between installed
and uninstalled capital. The most natural extra
ingredient is an adjustment cost or irrevers-
ibility: It is hard to get any work done on the
day the furniture is delivered, and it is hard to
take paint back off the walls and sell it. To
recognize these sensible features of investment,
we can reduce output during periods of high
investment or make negative investment costly
by modifying equation 15 to
17) ( , ) ( ,). Yf K L c I tt t t t =- × q
The dot reminds us that other variables may
influence the adjustment or irreversibility cost













Now, there is a difference between installed
and uninstalled capital, and the price of installed
capital can vary. Adding an extra unit of capital
tomorrow via extra investment costs 1–¶c(×)¶I
units of output today, while an extra unit of capi-
tal would give (1–d) units of capital tomorrow.






























where the last equality uses the quadratic func-
tional form. (This is the q theory of investment.
With an asymmetric c function, this is the basis
of the theory of irreversible investment. Abel
and Eberly [1996] give a recent synthesis with
references.)
Equation 18 shows that stock prices are
expected to be high when investment is high,
or firms are expected to issue stock and invest



























































































Comparing equation 19 with equation 16,
the investment return contains a new term pro-
portional to the change in investment. Since
investment is quite volatile, this model can be
consistent with the volatility of the market return.
In equation 18, the last term adds price changes
to the model of the investment return.
How does all this work? Figure 7 presents
the investment-output ratio along with the value
weighted P/D ratio. (The results are almost
identical using an investment-capital ratio with
capital formed from depreciated past investment.)
Equation 18 suggests that these two series should
move together. The cyclical movements in
investment and stock prices do line up prettyFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 29
well. The longer-term variation in P/D is not
mirrored in investment: This simple model
does not explain why investment stayed robust
in the late 1970s despite dismal stock prices.
However, the recent surge in the market is
matched by a surge in investment.
This kind of model has been subject to an
enormous formal empirical effort, which pretty
much confirms the figure. First, the model is
consistent with a good deal of the cyclical varia-
tion in investment and stock returns, both fore-
casts and ex-post. (See, for example, Cochrane,
1991c.) It does not do well with longer-term
trends in the P/D ratio. Second, early tests
relating investment to interest rates that imposed
a constant risk premium did not work (Abel,
1983). The model only works at all if one rec-
ognizes that most variation in the cost of capi-
tal comes from time-varying expected stock
returns with relatively constant interest rates.
Third, the model in equation 18 taken literally
allows no residual. If prices deviate one iota
from the right-hand side of equation 18, then
the model is statistically rejected—we can say
with perfect certainty that it is not a literal descrip-
tion of the data-generating mechanism. There is
a residual in actual data of course, and the resid-
ual can be correlated with other variables such
as cash flow that suggest the presence of finan-
cial frictions (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson,
1988). Finally, the size of the adjustment cost, a,
is the subject of the same kind of controversy
that surrounds the size of the risk aversion
coefficient, g. From equation 19 and the fact
that investment growth has standard deviation
of about 10 percent, a » 2 is needed to ratio-
nalize the roughly 20 percent standard devia-
tion of stock returns. With I/Y » 15% and
Y/K » 33%, and hence I/K » 1/20, a value a » 2










= F H I K x 15% = 0.75%, which does
not seem unreasonable. However, estimates of
a based on regressions, Euler equations, or
other techniques often result in much higher
values, implying that implausibly large frac-
tions of output are lost to adjustment costs.
This model does not yet satisfy the goal of
determining the equity premium by technological
considerations alone. Current specifications of
technology allow firms to transform resources
over time but not across states of nature. If the
firm’s own stock is undervalued, it can issue
more and invest. However, if the interest rate is
low, there is not much one can say about what
the firm should do without thinking about the
price of residual risk, and hence a preference
approach to the equity premium. Technically,
the marginal rate of transformation across
states of nature is undefined.
Implications of the recent surge in investment
and stock prices
The association between stock returns and
investment in figure 7 verifies that at least one
connection between stock re-
turns and the real economy
works in some respects as it
should. This argues against the
view that stock market swings
are due entirely to waves of
irrational optimism and pessi-
mism. It also verifies that the
flow of money into the stock
market does at least partially
correspond to new real assets
and not just price increases on
existing assets.
In particular, the surge in
stock prices since 1990 has been
accompanied by a surge in invest-
ment. If expected stock returns
and the cost of capital are low,
then investment should be high.
Statistically, high investment-
output or investment-capital






Value weighted portfolio P/D and investment
Notes: Investment-output ratio and P/D of value weighted NYSE.
Investment = gross fixed investment, output = gross domestic output.
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ratios also forecast low stock returns (Cochrane,
1991c). Thus, high investment provides additional
statistical and economic evidence for the view that
expected stock returns are quite low.
General equilibrium
To really understand the equity premium,
we need to combine the utility function and
production function modifications to construct
complete, explicit economic models that repli-
cate the asset pricing facts. This effort should
also preserve, if not enhance, our understanding
of the broad range of dynamic microeconomic,
macroeconomic, international, and growth
facts underpinning the standard models. The
task is challenging. Anything that affects the
relationship between consumption and asset
prices will affect the relationship between con-
sumption and investment. Asset prices mediate
the consumption-investment decision and that
decision lies at the heart of any dynamic macro-
economic model. We have learned a bit about
how to go about this task, but have developed
no completely satisfactory model as yet.
Jermann (1997) tried putting habit persis-
tence consumers in a model with a neoclassical
technology like equation 15, which is almost
completely standard in business-cycle models.
The easy opportunities for intertemporal trans-
formation provided by that technology meant
that the consumers used it to dramatically smooth
consumption, destroying the prediction of a
high equity premium. To generate the equity
premium, Jermann added an adjustment cost
technology like equation 17, as the production-
side literature had proposed. This modification
resulted in a high equity premium, but also
large variation in risk-free rates.
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1995) also
add habit-persistence preferences to real business
cycle models with frictions in the allocation of
resources to two sectors. They generate about
one-half of the historical Sharpe ratio. They
find some quantity dynamics are improved
over the standard model. However, their model
still predicts highly volatile interest rates and
persistent consumption growth.
To avoid the implications of highly volatile
interest rates, I suspect we will need represen-
tations of technology that allow easy transfor-
mation across time but not across states of nature,
analogous to the need for easy intertemporal
substitution but high risk aversion in preferences.
Alternatively, the Campbell-Cochrane model
above already produces the equity premium
with constant interest rates, which can be inter-
preted as a linear production function. Models
with this kind of precautionary savings motive
may not be as severely affected by the addition
of an explicit production technology.
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1997) use
non-state-separable preferences similar to those
of Epstein and Zin in a general equilibrium
model. They show that a model with standard
preferences and a model with non-state-separable
preferences can predict the same path of quan-
tity variables (such as output, investment, and
consumption) but differ dramatically on asset
prices. This example offers some explanation
of how the real business cycle and growth
literature could spend 25 years examining
quantity data in detail and miss all the modifi-
cations to preferences that we seem to need to
explain asset pricing data. It also means that
asset price information is crucial to identifying
preferences and calculating welfare costs of
policy experiments. Finally, it offers hope that
adding the deep modifications necessary to
explain asset pricing phenomena will not demolish
the success of standard models at describing
the movements of quantities.
Implications
The standard economic models, which
have been used with great success to describe
growth, macroeconomics, international economics,
and even dynamic microeconomics, do not
predict the historical equity premium, let alone
the predictability of returns. After ten years of
effort, a range of deep modifications to the
standard models show promise in explaining
the equity premium as a combination of high
risk aversion and new risk factors. Those modi-
fications are now also consistent with the broad
facts about consumption, interest rates, and
predictable returns. However, the modifications
have so far only been aimed at explaining asset
pricing data. We have not yet established
whether the deep modifications necessary to
explain asset market data retain the models’
previous successes at describing quantity data.
The modified models are drastic revisions
to the macroeconomic tradition. In the Campbell-
Cochrane model, for example, strong time-
varying precautionary savings motives balance
strong time-varying intertemporal substitution
motives. Uncertainty is of first-order importanceFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 31
in this model; linearizations near the steady
state and dynamics with the shocks turned off
give dramatically wrong predictions about the
model’s behavior. The costs of business cycles
are orders of magnitude larger than in standard
models. In the Constantinides-Duffie model,
one has to explicitly keep track of micro-
economic heterogeneity in order to say anything
about aggregates.
The new models are also a drastic revision
to finance. We are used to thinking of aversion
to wealth risk, as in the CAPM, as a good start-
ing place or first-order approximation. But this
view cannot hold. To justify the equity premium,
people must be primarily averse to holding
stocks because of their exposure to some other
state variable or risk factor, such as recessions
or changes in the investment opportunity set.
To believe in the equity premium, one has to
believe that these stories are sensible.
Finally, every quantitatively successful
current story for the equity premium still requires
astonishingly high risk aversion. The alternative,
of course, is that the long-run equity premium
is much smaller than the average postwar 8 per-
cent excess return. The standard model was
right after all, and historically high U.S. stock
returns were largely due to luck or some other
transient phenomenon.
Faced with the great difficulty economic
theory still has in digesting the equity premium,
I think the wise observer shades down the
estimate of the future equity premium even
more than suggested by the statistical uncer-
tainty documented above.
Portfolio implications
In sum, the long-term average stock return
may well be lower than the postwar 8 percent
average over bonds, and currently high prices
are a likely signal of unusually low expected
returns. It is tempting to take a sell recommen-
dation from this conclusion. There is one very
important caution to such a recommendation.
On average, everyone has to hold the market
portfolio. The average person does not change
his or her portfolio at all. For every individual
who keeps money out of stocks, someone else
must have a very long position in stocks. Prices
adjust until this is the case. Thus, one should
only hold less stocks than the average person if
one is different from everyone else in some
crucial way. It is not enough to be bearish, one
must be more bearish than everyone else.
In the economic models that generate the
equity premium, every investor is exactly happy
to hold his or her share of the market portfolio,
no more and no less. The point of the models is
that the superficial attractiveness of stocks is
balanced by a well-described source of risk, so
that people are just willing to hold them. Simi-
larly, the time variation in the equity premium
does not necessarily mean one should attempt
to time the market, buying more stocks at times
of high expected returns and vice versa. Every
investor in the Campbell-Cochrane model, for
example, holds exactly the same portfolio all
the time, while buy and sell signals come and
go. In the peak of a boom they are not feeling
very risk averse, and put their money in the
market despite its low expected returns. In the
bottom of a bust, they feel very risk averse, but
the high expected returns are just enough to
keep their money in the market.
To rationalize active portfolio strategies,
such as pulling out of the market at times of
high price ratios, you have to ask, who is there
who is going to be more in the market than
average now? And, what else are you going to
do with the money?
More formally, it is easy to crank out
portfolio advice, solutions to optimal portfolio
problems given objectives like the utility func-
tion in equation 3. Assuming low risk aversion,
and no labor income or other reason for time-
varying risk exposure or risk aversion, solutions
typically suggest large portfolio shares in equi-
ties and a strong market timing approach, some-
times highly leveraged and sometimes (now)
even short. (See Barberis, 1997; Brandt, 1997.)
If everyone followed this advice, however, the
equity premium and the predictable variation in
expected returns would disappear. Everyone
trying to buy stocks would simply drive up the
prices; everyone trying to time the market
would stabilize prices. Thus, the majority of
investors must be solving a different problem,
deciding on their portfolios with different
considerations in mind, so that they are always
just willing to hold the outstanding stocks and
bonds at current prices. Before going against
this crowd, it is wise to understand why the
crowd seems headed in a different direction.
Here, a good macroeconomic model of
stock market risk could be extremely useful.
The models describe why average consumers
are so afraid of stocks and why that fear changes
over time. Then, individuals in circumstancesECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 32
that make them different from everyone else
can understand why they should behave differ-
ently from the crowd. If you have no habits or
are immune to labor income shocks, in other
words if you are unaffected by the state vari-
ables or risk factors that drive the stock market
premium, by all means go your own way.
However, the current state of the art is not
advanced enough to provide concrete advice
along these lines.
The last possibility is that one thinks one
is smarter than everyone else, and that the
equity premium and predictability are just
patterns that are ignored by other people. This
is a dangerous stance to take. Someone must be
wrong in the view that he or she is smarter than
everyone else. Furthermore, this view also
suggests that the opportunities are not likely to
last. People do learn. The opinions in this article
are hardly a secret. We could interpret the recent
run-up in the market as the result of people
finally figuring out how good an investment
stocks have been for the last century, and build-
ing institutions that allow wide participation in
the stock market. If so, future returns are likely
to be much lower, but there is not much one can




















































































































This equation shows how price-dividend
ratios are exactly linked to subsequent returns,
dividend growth, or a potential bubble. It is
convenient to approximate this relation. We
can follow Cochrane (1991b) and take a Taylor
expansion now, or follow Campbell and Shiller
(1986) and Taylor and expand the first equa-
tion in 20 to
pd d r p d tt t t t t -= - + - ++ + + D 11 1 1 r ()
























I develop the consumption-portfolio prob-
lem in continuous time. This leads to a number
of simplifications that can also be derived as
approximations or specializations to the normal
distribution in discrete time. A security has
price P, dividend Ddt and thus instantaneous
rate of return dP/P + D/Pdt. The utility func-
tion is
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Letting the time interval shrink to zero,
we have
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Expanding the second moment, and divid-
ing by LP
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Using the power functional form,
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and solving for x,
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This equation is easier to solve in ratio
form; the fraction of consumption that the

























This equation is the basis for the calcula-
tions in table 5.
For small risks, we can approximate
u C x u C y u C y
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This establishes equation 4. For any other asset,

































































we have equation 5,














I drop the t subscript in the text where it
is not important to keep track of the difference
between conditional and unconditional moments.
Risk aversion calculations
What is the amount x that a consumer is
willing to pay every period to avoid a bet that
either increases consumption by y every period
or decreases it by the same amount? The an-
swer is found from the conditionECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 34
NOTES
1More formally, we can only reject hypotheses that the
true return is less than 3 percent or greater than 13 percent
with 95 percent probability.
2A bit more formally, if you start with a regression of log
returns on the P/D ratio, rt+1 = a + b p/dt + et+1, and a
similar autoregression of the P/D ratio, p/dt = m + r  p/dt-1
+ d t, then you can calculate the implied long-horizon
regression statistics. The fact that r is a very high number
implies that long-horizon return regression coefficients
and R2 rise with the horizon, as in the table. See Hodrick
(1992) and Cochrane (1991a) for calculations.
3The OLS regression estimate of r, is 0.90. However, this
estimate is severely downward biased. In a Monte Carlo
replication of the regression, a true coefficient r = 0.90
resulted in an estimate $ r, with a mean of 0.82, a median
of 0.83, and a standard deviation of 0.09. Assuming a true
coefficient of 0.98 produces an OLS estimator  $ rOLS, with
median 0.90. I therefore adjust for the downward bias of
the OLS estimate by using  $ r = 0.98.
4To generate a negative expected excess return, we have
to believe that the market return is negatively conditional-
ly correlated with the state variables that drive excess
returns, for example consumption growth. This is theoreti-
cally possible, but seems awfully unlikely.
5Craine (1993) does a formal test of price/dividend sta-
tionarity and connects the test to bubbles. My statements
are a superficial dismissal of a large literature. A lot of
careful attention has been paid to the bubble possibility,
but the current consensus seems to be that bubbles, as I
have defined them here, do not explain price variation.
6Eliminate the last term, multiply both sides by (pt – dt) –
E(pt – dt) and take expectations.
7Several ways around this argument do exist. Kocherlakota
(1990) defends a preference for later consumption. Kan-
del and Stambaugh (1991) note that the argument hinges
critically on the definition of Dc. If we define Dc as the
proportional change in consumption Dc = (Ct + Dt – Ct)/Ct
as I have (or, more properly, Dc = dC/C in continuous
time; see the appendix), then we obtain equation 4. How-
ever, if we define Dc as the change in log consumption,
Dc = ln (C t + Dt/Ct) or more properly Dc = d(ln C), we
obtain an additional term, r 
f = r +gE(Dc) – 1/2g
2s
2(Dc).
For g < 100 or so, the choice does not matter. The last
term is small, since E(Dc) » s(Dc) » 0.01. However, since
g is squared, the second term can be large with g = 250,
and can take the place of a negative r  in generating a
1 percent interest rate with 1 percent consumption growth.
What’s going on? The model u¢(C) = C
–250 is extraordinar-
ily sensitive to the probability of consumption declines.
The second model gives slightly higher weight to those
probabilities. Rather than rescue the model with g = 250,
in my evaluation, this example shows how special it is:
It says that interest rates as well as all asset prices depend
only on the probabilities assigned to extremely rare events.
8I specify bets on annual consumption to sidestep the
objection that most bets are bets on wealth rather than bets
on consumption. As a first-order approximation, consum-
ers will respond to lost wealth by lowering consumption
at every date by the same amount. More sophisticated
calculations yield the same qualitative results.
9The value function is formally defined as the achieved
level of expected utility. It is a function of wealth because
the richer you are, the happier you can get, if you spend
your wealth wisely. The value can also be a function of
other variables such as labor income or expected returns
that describe the environment. Thus,













The dot reminds us that there can be other arguments to
the value function. VW = uc is the “envelope” condition,
and follows from this definition.
10Precisely, define the “surplus consumption ratio,”
S = (C – X)/C, and denote s = ln S. Then s adapts to con-
sumption following a discrete-time “square root process”
s s s s
S
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Taking a Taylor approximation, this specification is
locally the same as allowing log habit x to adjust to
consumption,
x const x c tt t ++ »+ + - 11 1 .( ) . ff
Campbell and Cochrane specify that habits are “external”:
Your neighbor’s consumption raises your habit. This is a
simplification, since it means that each consumption
decision does not take into account its habit-forming
effect. They argue that this assumption does not greatly
affect aggregate consumption and asset price implications,
though it is necessary to reconcile the unpredictability of
individual consumption growth.
11Technically, this assertion depends on the form of the
utility function. For example, with log utility, consumers
don’t care about future returns. In this statement I am assum-
ing risk aversion greater than 1. See Campbell (1996).
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Since h  is independent of everything else, we can use
E[f(hy)] = E[f(hy)½y)]. Now, with h  normal, E (exp
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13There is a possibility that the square root term in equa-
tions 11 and 12 might be negative. Constantinides and
Duffie rule out this possibility by assuming that the
discount factor m satisfies
13
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in every state of nature, so that the square root term is
positive.
We can sometimes construct such discount factors by
picking parameters a, b in mt = max [a + bRt, e-r (Ct/Ct–1)-g]
to satisfy equation 14. However, neither this construction
nor a discount factor satisfying equation 13 is guaranteed
to exist for a given set of assets. The restriction in equation
13 is a tighter form of the familiar restriction that mt³ 0 is
equivalent to the absence of arbitrage in the assets under
consideration. Presumably, this restriction is what rules
out markets for individual labor income risks in the
model. The example m = 1/R that I use is a positive dis-
count factor that prices a single asset return 1 = E(R–1R),
but does not necessarily satisfy the restriction in equation
13. For high R, we can have very negative ln1/R. This
is why the lines in figure 6 run into the horizontal axis
at high R.
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